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FEDERAL CML PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY-STATE LAW CoN· 
TROLLING IN CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES AS LEGAL OR EQUITABLE-An ac-
tion for declaratory reliefl was brought in a federal district court to deter-
mine the validity of a contingent fee contract and the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees in a will contest case. Plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment was sustained. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded 
with instructions to grant defendant's motion for jury trial, in accordance 
with Olclahoma practice, on the question whether the contingent fee con-
tract was fair and free from fraud.2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,8 
vacated the judgment,' and remanded the case for reconsideration in the 
light of a recent state decision.5 On reconsideration by the court of appeals 
of its order granting defendant's motion for jury trial, held, reversed and 
remanded. Since cancellation of the contingent fee contract, the basic re-
lief being sought, is an equitable action under present Oklahoma law, 
there is no right of trial by jury. SimleT v. Conner, 295 F.2d 534 HOth Cir. 
1961). 
1 The change in form of an action to one for declaratory relief has no effect upon 
a litigant's right to trial by jury. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 254 
(1949); Hargrove v. American CenL Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1942); Pacific lndem, 
Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939). See also McCoid, Right to Jury Trial in 
the Federal Courts, 45 IowA L. REv. 726, 739 (1960); Shimer, Jury Trials in Declaratory 
Relief .Actions: The Right Exists, But Under What Ci'fcumstances1, 6 U.C.LA. L REv. 
678 (1959). 
2 Simler v. Conner, 282 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1960). 
s Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486 (1961). 
, Three Justices dissented on the ground that plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial 
as required by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, prior decisions, and the 
seventh amendmenL 
5 See Southard v. MacDonald, 860 P .2d 940 (Okla. 1961), which stated at 941, "Where 
it is ne~ to cancel a contingent fee contract before any other relief prayed for can 
be granted, and the cancellation of such contract is the basic relief sought, neither party 
is entitled to a jury trial for the reason that the cancellation is a purely equitable matter." 
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Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, it 
has been held that although Rule 2 provides for but one form of civil ac-
tion, there remains implicit in our concept of jurisprudence the distinc-
tion between legal actions, triable on demand by jury, 6 and equitable 
actions, in which there is no right to jury trial as none existed at common 
law.1 Rule 38, preserving the right of trial by jury as declared by the 
seventh amendment or as given by a statute of the United States, neither 
enlarges nor restricts the right to jury trial, but merely insures its enjoy-
ment if the right exists.8 Nor does Rule 38 attempt to enumerate the in-
stances in which trial by jury shall be preserved, leaving such determina-
tion to be made on the basis of legal precedent.9 Consequently, a problem 
has arisen, as yet unanswered by the Supreme Court, whether, in suits 
founded on diversity of citizenship, characterization of the relief sought 
as legal or equitable is to be governed by federal law or by the law of the 
state in which the federal court resides. The problem arises in but a few 
cases, for the practical difference in applying state law or federal law to 
characterize an action is likely to be minimal, since the tests employed by 
both in characterizing most actions are of common historical derivation.10 
When the question has arisen, however, the lower federal courts have not 
reached uniform results, some holding that state law,11 and others that 
federal Iaw,12 should controJ.1s 
Those supporting the view that state law should determine the exist-
ence of the right to jury trial would rely primarily upon the doctrine of 
' s Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 253 (1855) •. 
T Bcrcslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947);'Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co., 137 F.2d 62 (lid Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 '(1943); Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday 
Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942); Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321 
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty c:q, 30 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1939). 
See McK.enna, Trial by Jury Under the Federal Rules, 29 GEO. L.J. 88 (1940). 
8 City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949); Ettleson v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co,, supra note 7; Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 7 F.R.D. 343 (E.D.N.Y. 
1947); Fleming v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 38 F. Supp. 1001 (W .D. La. 1941); Frazer 
v. Geist, l F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
9 Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922). See also Hogan, The 
Effect of the Merger of Law and Equity on the Right of the Jury Trial in Federal 
Courts, 36 GEO. L.J. 666 (1948); McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure, 
88 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1940). 
10 Also, no jury may be demanded, or there may be no opposition to the demand. 
Yet Rule 39(a) provides that the court on its own motion may find no right to jury 
trial and set the case for court trial. 
11 See, e.g., Beagle v. Northern Pac. Ry., 32 F.Supp. 17 (W.D. Wash. 1940); Ross 
v. Service Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1940). 
12 See, e.g., Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1959); Bowie v. 
Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322 (D. Colo. 1954); 
Logan v. Holman, 7 F.R.D. 596 (D.N.J. 19-!7); Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321 
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore. 
1939). 
18 See generally 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.10 (2d ed. 1951); Annot., 43 
A.L.R.2d 781 (1955); Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New 
Federal Procedure, Sl CALIF. L. REv. 127 (1943). 
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Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,14 and the viable concept of "substantive" rights 
it propounds. Under Erie the existence of a remedy and its characterization 
as legal or equitable would be viewed as involving more than mere proce-
dural questions.15 The argument is that since the intent of Erie was to 
insure substantial uniformity in the outcome of litigation, whether insti-
tuted in a state or federal court, the matter of right to a jury trial might 
well be considered "substantive" by virtue of the fact that it has an im-
portant bearing on the outcome of litigation.16 
Apart from Erie, however, it can also be argued that either basis for 
characterization must entail a consideration of the substantive elements 
of the right sought to be enforced, such as the conditions under which 
relief will be granted, the appropriate remedy and its means of enforce-
ment. Since questions such as whether enforcement is by personal decree, 
whether doctrines such as "clean hands" are applicable and whether an 
inadequate remedy at law must be shown, are present in delineating the 
character and scope of every right, and are questions determined by the 
particular state granting the right, state law must of necessity play the 
primary role in defining the very matter which is to be characterized as 
legal or equitable. A further reason favoring state characterization would 
be avoidance of the diverse results between a state and federal forum oc-
casioned by the merely fortuitous circumstance of diversity of citizenship.17 
Recourse to state law, it is contended, would make for conformity in rules 
of decision, thereby avoiding such anomalous results. 
Yet, despite the purported command of Erie and the desire to achieve 
uniformity in local rules of decision, countervailing considerations seem-
ingly indicate that the right to jury trial is a procedural matter, thus 
more desirably, and perhaps mandatorily, a question of federal law. 
First, it may be questioned whether the dissimilarity between judge and 
jury as triers of fact is of sufficient magnitude to entitle a party to claim 
a divergence of result under the "outcome" test of Erie.18 Moreover, should 
the "outcome" test be held applicable, it is difficult to envisage, as a prac-
tical matter, any workable standard by which the magnitude of diver-
gence can be determined. Secondly, the view making characterization of 
the right a question of federal law is, by analogy, in accord with the ac-
cepted conflict-of-laws position which regards the question as procedural,19 
14 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
15 Beagle v. Northern Pac. Ry., 32 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Wash. 1940); Ross v. Service 
Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1940). See Gavitt, States' Rights and Federal Pro-
cedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1949). 
16 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See MooRE, op. cit. supra note 13, 
§ 38.09. 
17 See Gavitt, supra note 15, at 19. 
18 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
19 3 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1607 (1935); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT 
OF LAws §§ 585, 594 (1958); Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 44 (1941); 12 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1928); 88 
U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1940). 
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and, as such, governed by the law of the forum on the theory that one 
forum should neither be forced in each case to determine whether or not 
the court of another forum would submit the case to a jury, nor con-
tinuously to make over its "machinery" for the administration of justice.20 
Also, to allow state law to govern would run counter to the congressional 
objective of establishing uniformity of procedure throughout the federal 
courts as an independent system for the administration of justice.21 
By far, however, the most important considerations are those which 
hinge upon an interpretation of the seventh amendment, which constitu-
tionally guarantees the right to jury trial as it existed in its fundamental 
elements as part of the common law of England as of the time the amend-
ment was adopted.22 The construction of the meaning of a constitutional 
provision should always be a federal question, determined exclusively on 
the basis of federal law.23 As the Constitution necessarily must mean the 
same in all parts of the United States, the characterization of the right as 
procedural or substantive under the Erie doctrine would be of no sig-
nificance, for in either case it is a matter governed by the federal constitu-
tion, upon which state law should have no influence.24 Since the purpose 
of the seventh amendment is to preserve the substance of the common-law 
right of trial by jury,25 to allow state law to be controlling would enable 
the state, by a process of attrition, to encroach upon this constitutional 
right through statute and decision. To do so would make the constitutional 
guarantee of trial by jury in federal courts continuously shift with the 
20 This argument loses force when it is considered that conflicts rules are designed 
for courts which do not continuously and traditionally apply foreign law, and there• 
fore have a substantial burden imposed upon them when forced to determine whether 
or not another forum would submit the case to a jury. By comparison, most district 
court judges know as much about state law as do the state court judges, and apply state 
law almost as frequently. 
21 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. See Ilsen, supra note 19. 
22 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Balti-
more & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 
474 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961). See Sparks, Federal Courts: Right to Jury Trial in Cases Involving 
Both Equitable and Legal Issues, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 760 (1959). 
23 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra 
note 22; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202 
(1893); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891); McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201 
(1887). See Holtzoff, supra note 13, at 140. 
24 The holding of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is qualified at 78, 
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the 
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." 
25 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Herron v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931); Gillen v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1952); 
Ettclson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1943); Diederich v. American 
News, 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942). See Baggett, Federal Practice, the Jury Right in 
Diversity Cases, 9 OKLA. L. REv. 74 (1956). On the question of enlargement and re-
striction of the right to jury trial, see 5 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 13, § 38.11. 
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diversities and vagaries of local law.26 Illustratively, while state rules of 
procedure often conform to federal practice, states are not required by 
the Constitution to maintain the historic line between the functions of 
the jury and those of the court.27 As such, they may decrease the size of 
the jury2s or do away with it altogether,29 or modify the requirements for 
a verdict,30 or make the jury judges of law as well as of fact.81 Though the 
force of these illustrations is somewhat mitigated by the fact that, as to 
them, the alteration is directly aimed at modifying the character of the 
right to jury trial, whereas a change in the characterization of a right as 
legal or equitable would affect the right to jury trial only indirectly, the 
constitutional objections would seem to remain. Moreover, in a federal 
forum the adoption of local practices of this type could work not only to 
deprive a litigant of his constitutional rights,32 but conceivably to enlarge 
them by making every non-federal issue, including the most complicated 
and those undoubtedly equitable under former practice, triable to a jury 
on demand in federal courts. 83 
By similar reasoning, moreover, other related questions arising under 
the seventh amendment have been held to be matters determinable by 
federal law, notwithstanding state statutes or constitutional provisions to 
the contrary.34 For example, it has been held that statutes declaring that 
only a scintilla of evidence is sufficient to require submission of the case 
to a jury,315 or state constitutional provisions requiring that the defenses 
of contributory negligence or assumption or risk must always be submitted 
to the jury,86 are not binding on judges in diversity cases. To hold other-
wise, it is said, would result in a usurpation of the power of the judiciary 
26 See Green, Protection of Jury Trial in Diversity Cases Against State Invasions, 35 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 768 (1957). 
27 Chicago, Rocle Island &: Pac. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54 (1919). 
2s See American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897), where statute author-
izing verdict by nine or more jurors was held inapplicable to federal proceeding in 
diversity cases. 
29 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875). 
so Minneapolis &: St. L. Ry v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). 
81 Statutes making the jury judges of the law as well as of fact in proceedings for 
libel are common in some of the states. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 
(1895); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 1 (1794). 
82 Common-law rules are not recognized in Louisiana under a civil law system which 
gives judgment on the facts without intervention of jury. See Wright v. Paramount-
Richards Theatres, 198 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952). 
33 See Green, supra note 26. 
34 See, e.g., Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 360 U.S. 273 (1959); Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
SIS Allen v. Matson Nav. Co., 255 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1958); Reuter v. Eastern Air 
Lines, 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955); Lowry v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 171 F.2d 625 (5th 
Cir. 1948); White v. New York Life Ins. Co., 145 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1944). But cf. Pierce 
Consulting Engineering Co. v. City of Burlington, 221 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1955); Lovas v. 
General Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1954). 
36 St. Louis, I.M. &: S. Ry. v. Vickers, 122 U.S. 360 (1887); Basham v. City Bus Co., 
219 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1955); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 
1942); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Davis, 41 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1930). 
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to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence and, as such, contravene the seventh 
amendment's mandate preserving the historic functions of judge and jury. 
The considerations applicable to these decisions, the preservation of the 
right to a jury trial as it existed at common law free from state encroach-
ment, and the retention of the historic separation of functions between 
judge and jury, seem equally applicable to the present problem of which 
law should be used in characterizing issues as legal or equitable. Thus, the 
better view seems to be that federal law should govern the determination 
of whether the right to trial by jury exists. 
Donald E. Vacin, S.Ed. 
